A Melbourne worker who represented himself at the Fair Work Commission has lost out on an over $18,000 unfair dismissal payout. This came after he misinterpreted the Fair Work Act 2009 and mistakenly believed he was entitled to a cooling-off period on a legally binding settlement.
This Fair Work unfair dismissal decision Linh Tran v Westpac Banking Corporation [2025] serves as a compelling case study on the dangers of navigating Australia’s industrial relations landscape without expert guidance.
In this article, we’ll explore the blunders this worker made with his Fair Work unfair dismissal claim. We’ll also look at another recent Commission case involving a uni lecturer who claimed he was being persecuted for being a “white” male.
He launched a general protections claim as part of his “crusade” against Monash University’s DEI policy. The claim ultimately came undone due to the many errors he made as a self-represented claimant.
Self-represented worker loses out on $18K unfair dismissal payout
Melbourne-based Linh Tran had lodged an unfair dismissal claim against Westpac in June 2025. He represented himself during Fair Work Commission proceedings. In July 2025, the Commission held a conciliation between the two parties that led to a legally binding settlement. It was agreed that Westpac would pay Mr. Tran $18,693.21 and accept his resignation.
However, around two weeks after agreeing to this settlement Mr. Tran sought to withdraw from it. He claimed that he had only verbally agreed to the settlement. Mr. Tran emailed the Commission and Westpac saying that he wanted to pull out. He held the mistaken belief that he was legally entitled to a cooling-off period, which would allow him to rescind the settlement.
Unfair dismissal VIC: Lodged dismissal appeal late
The Fair Work Commission held a hearing in August 2025 to determine the status of the settlement. The Commission delivered an ex tempore (oral) decision, finding that a binding agreement had been reached. As a result, Mr. Tran’s Fair Work unfair dismissal claim was thrown out on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success.
But in September 2025, Mr. Tran lodged a notice of appeal with the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission. He had lodged it five days outside the 21-day statutory deadline for lodging an appeal. This meant the Full Bench would have to decide whether to grant an extension of time, in addition to hearing Mr. Tran’s arguments about the settlement.
Argued self-represented workers had right to cooling-off period
Mr. Tran argued to the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission that he was denied procedural fairness because he did not receive the benefit of a cooling-off period. He contended this was a legal entitlement, particularly since he believed he was not represented by a lawyer or paid agent under the definitions within the Fair Work Act 2009. Mr. Tran had observed the common practice of Commission conciliators offering three-day cooling-off periods to unrepresented parties and saw this as a right.
He also argued that the Commission had erred in its finding there was a binding settlement agreement. Mr. Tran asserted that any agreement reached was conditional upon signing a formal deed. He argued that since the deed Westpac later sent provisions beyond the agreed terms, the settlement was not complete or binding.
Based on these two arguments, Mr. Tran contended that his Fair Work unfair dismissal claim still had reasonable prospects of success and should not have been dismissed.
Cooling-off period claim debunked
The Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission rejected Mr. Tran’s argument that he was entitled to a cooling-off period. It clarified that his assumption that a cooling-off period was a “statutory safeguard” for Fair Work unfair dismissal settlements was incorrect. The Full Bench noted that the only reference to a cooling-off period in the Fair Work Act 2009 relates to the Commission’s power to suspend industrial action, not individual dismissals.
The Full Bench acknowledged that offering a three-day cooling-off period to unrepresented parties was common practice. However, it made a critical distinction often missed by self-represented applicants: a frequent practice does not equate to a legislated entitlement. The Full Bench said that Westpac was under no legal obligation to offer a cooling-off period. It stated that Mr. Tran’s agreement to the terms during conciliation was binding regardless of whether this common courtesy was extended.
Self-represented worker misinterpreted Fair Work unfair dismissal definitions
In his appeal, Mr. Tran also argued that the Fair Work Commission had erred in finding that he was represented, a point which he felt disqualified him from the cooling-off benefit he mistakenly thought was available. This highlighted another common pitfall for the unrepresented: confusion over the specific legal definitions within the Commission’s jurisdiction.
The Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission noted that Mr. Tran was in fact represented at the conciliation conference in July 2025 by a union official. It clarified the definitions of “lawyer” and “paid agent” in the Fair Work Act 2009. It said that these primarily specify when a party needs permission from the Commission to be represented, not to define the only circumstances in which a party is considered to have representation. Since Mr. Tran did not have a legal right to a cooling-off period, the question of whether he was represented became legally moot.
Settlement was legally binding
The Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission next turned to Mr. Tran’s argument that there was no binding settlement agreement. It agreed with the Fair Work Commission’s finding that a binding agreement had been reached. This was despite Westpac sending an updated deed following the conciliation.
Ultimately, the Full Bench found that Mr. Tran’s appeal did not raise issues of importance or general application, nor did it manifest an injustice. His misunderstanding of the law was not enough to enliven the “public interest” requirement needed to grant permission to appeal a Fair Work unfair dismissal decision under the Fair Work Act 2009.
Self-represented lecturer launches $7.5 million anti-DEI ‘crusade’ against Monash University
Another recent case that serves as a lesson of the risks of representing yourself at the Fair Work Commission is Dr. Reuben Kirkham v Monash University, National Tertiary Education Industry Union & Others [2024]. Dr. Reuben Kirkham worked as a lecturer at Monash University. His termination of employment took place in April 2024 for performance-related reasons. Dr. Kirkham responded by lodging a general protections claim with the Commission.
He argued that his termination of employment was not about performance but due to his identity and beliefs. His general protections claim was passed on to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. In his statement of claim to the Court, Mr. Kirkham described himself as a “white”, “young”, “British”, “non-indigenous male” with “conservative political beliefs.” He alleged that he was discriminated against by the university’s diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) policy. He claimed the policy contravened the Fair Work Act 2009 and caused him to be a target.
Credit: Google Scholar
Wanted DEI officials dismissed to restore Australian uni sector to ‘former glory’
Mr. Kirkham’s general protections claim alleged breaches of the Fair Work Act 2009, which protects against adverse action based on attributes including race, colour and national extraction. The extent of the alleged breaches was articulated with striking language. Dr. Kirkham claimed that Monash University was “practically farting contraventions here, there and everywhere.” However, he said that these contraventions were “a lot more poisonous than a fleeting bad smell.”
Mr. Kirkham not only sought reinstatement and promotion to associate professor, but also more than $7.5 million in compensation and penalties. He had named Monash University and 17 of its staff as respondents to his general protections claim. He had also named the National Tertiary Education Industry Union as a respondent. Mr. Kirkham sought remedies that included declaring each of the individual respondents a “corrupt public official.” He wanted them to be stripped of their academic titles and prohibited from exercising any public role ever again. He also wanted the termination of employment for all DEI-appointed employees and all non-legitimate academic staff.
Mr. Kirkham stated that the success of his case would be a “good start” towards “repairing” the Australian university sector and “restoring it to its former glory.” He told the Court that the matter was a “crusade” for him.
Self-represented lecturer’s ‘incoherent’ claim caused issues
Dr. Kirkham’s decision to represent himself became central to the ultimate rejection of his general protections claim. The matter was initially allocated to the Fair Work Commission. Given the complexity of Dr. Kirkham’s claim, which the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission later described as “substantially incoherent”, the Commission held a preliminary view that the application against all respondents other than Monash University could not succeed due to the absence of an employment relationship.
The Commission had to set a deadline for Dr. Kirkham to withdraw his applications against the other non-employer parties. When he failed to do so, the Commission dismissed the claims against the non-employer respondents. It then issued a certificate allowing proceedings against Monash University to commence in court.
Dr. Kirkham appealed this decision, contending the Commission had “improperly” issued the certificate. At the appeal hearing before a Full Bench, Dr. Kirkham opposed the joint application by the respondents for legal representation. The Full Bench granted permission for the university and individual respondents to be legally represented. This was because his claim raised “issues of some legal complexity.”
‘Full of irrelevancy’: Self-represented lecturer makes mess of court statement
Following the Fair Work Commission process, Dr. Kirkham commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court. The Court was tasked with assessing the validity of his statement of claim. It was highly critical, describing the claim as a “huge manifesto” and one that “almost defies proper description.”
The Court highlighted the significant issues arising from the self-represented academic’s approach to formal legal pleadings. It noted that Dr. Kirkham had been warned about the complexity of the jurisdiction and the need to refine his statement of claim. It said that it needed to be “well and truly refined” because it was “full of irrelevancy.” The Court found the 173-page claim to be “prolix” and said that it was written like it were an “academic paper.”
It said that it was “bereft of any particularisation of factual allegations” and had not complied with any of the requirements needed for a proper statement of claim. Furthermore, the document was criticised for not having consecutively numbered paragraphs, instead rolling up “many allegations… in different paragraphs.” The Court said this made it “difficult, if not impossible” to know what aspect of the complaint is being dealt with in particular paragraphs.
‘Scandalous’ general protections claim took aim at ‘leftist’ court officials, union
The Federal Circuit and Family Court concluded that Mr. Kirkham was only interested in “revenge” upon the university and those “he feels have wronged him.” Furthermore, the remedies sought—which included dismissing DEI-appointed employees and declaring individual respondents as “corrupt”—led the Court to describe the document as “scandalous.” It said that its primary purpose was to cause “maximum embarrassment” for the university and deemed it an “abuse of the processes of court.”
The Court also highlighted the inflammatory and non-legal nature of some of Mr. Kirkham’s submissions. This included a “rant” and “scurrilous accusations” about members of the judiciary whom he regarded as being “left leaning.” Dr. Kirkham had also addressed the union’s lack of support for him. He claimed that it had been “promoting attacks on intellectual freedom,” especially against those with “gender critical views such as myself.”
General protections claim dismissed
The Court had previously warned Mr. Kirkham about the risks of self-litigation. It said that while there is “no disadvantage” to self-representation, “neither is there an advantage.” The Court stated that an employee who lodged their own claim “can’t say that they did not know what they had to do” because they are self-represented.
Ultimately, the Court ordered that the statement of claim be struck out in whole, leading to the dismissal of Mr. Kirkham’s general protections claim.
Read more: Lodging an unfair dismissal claim yourself versus hiring a representative
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